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This paper develops the two-period model of enterprise shutdown during transition
that was introduced in Ericson (1994). Its purpose is to provide a formal basis
for the study of what Kornai (1994) has called the "transformation of the real
structure of the economy" during the transition process. It focuses at the industry
level of restructuring, taking a normative, industrial policy, perspective.
Most of the discussion in the transition literature of the restructuring of indus-
try deals with creating the institutional environment, and hence the appropriate
incentives, for state firms to restructure themselves and for new firms to succeed
and grow. Discussions of "liberalization," "stabilization," implementing "priva-
tization," and fostering "competition," and the analysis of the consequences of
such policies, have dominated the literature.1 There is also a growing empirical
literature on the key role played by the development of 'new firms,' frequently
unrelated to any prior existing organizations in the economy.2 Yet the focus in
* Department of Economics and The Harriman Institute, Columbia University. I have bene-
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1See, for example, the survey of economic transitions in Gelb et. al. (1996), McMillan
(1995), and the Blanchard, PVoot and Sachs (1994) collection of papers on the transition in
Eastern Europe through 1993.
2As Peter Murrell (1996, p. 39) notes, "There is universal agreement that new private firms
have been of great significance." For example, how and why they are important is explored
almost all of this literature is on the shifting of labor, on employment and un-
employment and the barriers to smooth reallocation of labor between the state
and private sectors. It is implicitly assumed that all other factors of production,
all other aspects of industrial restructuring, will easily shift to accommodate an
appropriate reallocation of labor and modernization of activity within the enter-
prise.3 Ai£ that is required is appropriate incentives to get managers and workers
to desire, and hence to implement, the requisite changes. In so assuming, how-
ever, the general literature has underestimated the difficulties involved, difficulties
arising from the structural legacy of the Soviet-type command economy.
The transition from a command to a market-based economy involves a more
substantial change in the structure of production, employment and factor use than
is typically assumed, as much of the prior physical and organizational capital is not
viable in a market environment.4 Furthermore, the market institutions, in partic-
ular financial, that mobilize and reallocate real resources for the ongoing changes
characteristic of a market economy5 are conspicuously underdeveloped and/or
absent. Thus resources currently employed in existing institutions are largely im-
mobile, tied up by those organizations having immediate physical control. This
immobility of real resources is only aggravated by the weakness or absence of well
defined and protected property rights that facilitate the reallocation/transfer of
real assets.6 While appropriate reforms and the passage of sufficient time will
ameliorate these problems as the transition proceeds, that transition's success de-
pends in no small measure on the restructuring of production and other economic
in some detail in Johnson and Loveman (1995) for the Polish case and in Richter and Schaffer
(1996) and Earle and Rose (1996) for the Russian case.
3
 A partial exception is the simple model of 'disorganization' in Lecture 1 of Blanchard (1995),
where asymmetric information creates a coordination problem causing input disruptions and an
excessive loss of output in the state sector.
4As I have argued elsewhere (Ericson, 1991), economic activity and organizations in the
Soviet-type system were built, and functioned, without any consideration of real economic (op-
portunity) costs or benefits, other than those of the narrowly pursued priorities of the central
authorities at the time of their construction. Thus there is no guarantee of any structure's via-
bility, never mind profitability, in a market environment, and much of that structure is, indeed,
net value destroying (see Ericson, 1996).
5See Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) for a seminal study of the dramatic, continual
change in the U.S. economy.
6Of course, alternative.mechanisms have arisen in the private (shadow economy) sector, pro-
viding Gerschenkronian substitutes for legal guarantees and enforcement of property and con-
tractual rights. These substitutes are, of course, highly imperfect, carrying very high attendant
'transactions costs' as discussed in Leitzel (1995), Chapter 2.
activity, which in turn depends on the mobility of the underlying means of pro-
duction. Indeed, calls for looser monetary policy to revive enterprise cash flow
and thereby stimulate investment are, ultimately, addressing this need.7
One way to cut through this problem is to shut down net value destroying
operations,8 forcing the release of those resources over which they have operational
control (if not well defined ownership). That both limits the waste of social
resources, and makes possible a greater inflow of new, more productive firms.
In an increasingly marketized environment this requires allowing failing firms to
shut down (bankruptcy), rather than supporting them with subsidies, credits, tax
holidays, or tolerating growing payments, tax and/or wage arrears. Of course,
there are substantial social costs to such closing of industrial enterprises, costs
which are increasing in the scale of such activity. Were there full information on
the viability of firms, there would be economically clear and easy, if politically
very difficult, trade-offs to be made. However, in the unstable environment of the
early to mid-transition, market performance may be only a very poor signal as to
the potential viability of the firm. This uncertainty introduces an 'option value'
to waiting and learning more about the firm's viability, as the decision to close
the firm is not costlessly reversible.
As discussed in Ericson (1994), there are two types of mistakes possible: (i)
shutting down a potentially viable firm based on weak early performance; and (ii)
maintaining a net value-destroying firm. The optimal one-time (static) decision on
maintaining money losing enterprises trades off the costs of these errors in choosing
a rather conservative shutdown policy. Here we continue that investigation in a
two-period extension of that model, developing the analysis of the factors that
determine the optimal dynamic shutdown policy for apparently failing firms of
a given industry. Again it is from the perspective of a weak industrial policy
maker, who can withhold state support from firms in the industry, but cannot
directly manage them or create new firms in the industry; new firms arise from
entrepreneurial initiative responding to perceived opportunities.
The principle result of the model is a complete characterization of the opti-
7This can be seen in the policy prescriptions of Sergei Glaziev, the new Chief of the Secu-
rity Council's Economic Security Administration interviewed in Trud, 26 September 1996, or
the group of "Academicians" and their American advisors during the recent Russian presiden-
tial campaign. See, for example, the latter's manifesto "Novaia ekonomicheskaia politika dlia
Rossii" Nezavisimaia gazeta, 1 July 1996, pp. 1,4.
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 By "net value destroying" I mean that the market value of output produced is insufficient
to cover the full costs of production, including the opportunity cost of the factors of land, labor,
and capital.
mal shutdown policy under varying assumptions about information quality and
decision horizon. The results support early decisive action in closing sufficiently
"bad" firms, although the likelihood threshold (probability that a firm is viable)
below which a firm is closed is still rather conservatively chosen. A longer horizon
and better information about the 'quality' of the firm both raise the threshold for
a firm to be allowed to survive. The most aggressive optimal policy occurs under
full information with a long horizon. Earlier shutdown is also seen to dominate
later, given that it should occur. However, sufficiently improved information in
the future may lead to a more cautious initial policy, as that increases the value
of waiting, although that effect is usually dominated by the increased marginal
value of future shutdown possibilities.
In the next section we present the notation and structure of the model. In
Section 3 we analyze the two-stage problem with discrete firms — the direct gen-
eralization of the prior model. Then in Section 4 we explore some policy relevant
comparative statics. Finally we conclude with a discussion of some implications
for industrial restructuring in the transition economies.
2. Model Structure.
Consider an industry of N firms, indexed i = 1, . . . ,JV. The current net value
produced by firm i is given by an i.i.d. random variable r/j with fixed finite support
W = {w\,... ,WK} and distribution P{r) \ 0i}, where 0* € {0,9} indicates whether
the firm is 'bad' or 'good', i.e. able to survive in the coming market economy. Let
P+ = p{n\ey, P- =
Vl = E{n\6}>0; yo = E{V\6}<0; (2.1)
and assume p+ >- p~ in the sense of first order stochastic dominance:
r/>o »?><*
As Oi is not observed, let TT* € (0,1) be the prior estimate that firm i is 'good'
(of quality 0 ) and TT^7/) be its Bayesian update on observing r\:
7f(r/) =
 + * '?} . . (2.3)
KU
 7 T p + + ( l 7 I > - V
Then the current expected net return to operating a firm with estimate of 'quality'
7T is :
y* = E{q | TT} = 7T • (yi - y0) + yo. (2.4)
If 7T < 7f = ~j^ , then 2/TT < 0 and the firm is expected net value destroying,
i.e. in all likelihood that 9 = 0, while 7T > 7f means that the firm is expected to
contribute to social wealth. The expected net social returns to the functioning of
all firms in the industry is then given by
This includes negative expected returns generated by those firms operating with
?Tj < 7f, and hence could be increased by shutting those firms down.
Closing firms has three impacts: (i) the loss of the (negative) net product of
the closed firms (52 Vic) 5 (ii) the costs associated with closure, disruption of eco-
nomic ties, and maintenance of the released factors of production are imposed;
and (iii) the prospects for new firms entering the industry are enhanced, due to
diminished competition and increased availability of released resources to support
their operation. The second effect is modeled by a convex, increasing function,
C(m), where m is the number (mass/volume) of firms shutdown in the period, and
a function giving the continuing (social) cost of maintaining the unemployed re-
sources of the industry, c(L), where L is the number (mass) of potential new firms
that could be formed using the available resources. The final effect is captured in
a probability measure over the entry of new firms, i/L, which gives the probability
that some number (mass), £, of new entrants will operate in the period: vL(£). In
the simple discrete case it is given by:
VL > 1, i ^ > 0 ;
(l-ltf-r > l-vf, *€{2 , . . . ,L} ; (2.6)
where v\ = vL(£)9. We assume that entry takes time, and hence entrants come
out of preexisting resources; current shutdowns only add resources to the next
9These conditions are satisfied by, among other distributions, a truncated Poisson distribu-
tion, p(x) = ^ e ~ A x , with A < 2 and the mass of the tail placed on x — 0. Note that the tail
conditions in the second line imply that the number of entrants is concave in L — the pressure
for any bundle of resources to be reused is diminishing in the volume of unused resources.
period's entry pool. By the selection process that generates new entry, entrants
must be expected to be 'good' [type 0], although they may actually turn out to be
of type 0_. Hence we assume a prior quality estimate of q > 7f yielding expected
firm payoff
yq = q • (2/1 - yo) + 2/0, (2.7)
and expected net social payoff from new entrants,
1=1
when the pool of available resources is L.
The objective of the industrial policy maker in this model is to maximize net
social wealth over the course of the transition by a judicious choice of shutdowns
—the order and timing of closure of (presumably) 'bad' firms. We assume that
controlling new entry is beyond the capabilities of the policy maker, and hence
arises exogenously from "the market." The policy maker can however 'fuel' entry
by releasing resources to the market through shutdown (i.e. failure to sufficiently
subsidize) existing operating enterprises. The general dynamic problem, given
total social resources capable of supporting the operation of a set N of firms,
facing the policy maker is thus:
iMt}t=0 ^t=0 \ie(N\At)\Mt
(2.8)
where Mt is the set of firms to be shut, Lt — the set of potential ('latent') firms,
and At CZ Lt — the set of new entrants at time t, r is the recovered cost of a
latent firm that becomes active, c(L) = c • L is the continuing cost of maintaining
the viability of the resource pool L, and Tt is the information available at time
t. The solution to this problem yields a value depending on the initial payoff-
relevant parameters (state variables) of the problem: VT(TT, NQ, LQ).10 This prob-
lem's solution also generates the optimal sequences {(Mt,7r^),Nt,Lt}t:=0, where
TT£ is the optimal cutoff expectation for shutting down firms (see below). Clearly
Nt+1 = (Nt\Mt) U At, Lt+1 = (Lt\At) U Mt, and Nt + Lt = N.n
10
 Note that No is somewhat redundant as it is contained in the dimension of the vector of
prior qualities, TT. Indeed, in a full dynamic version of the model we set TT^  = 0 for alii £ Lt, so
that the vector TT € [0,1]^ contains all relevant information on the state of the industry.
11
 For clarity we have assumed that the total resources available to the industry are fixed. It
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3. Optimal Shutdown with Two Periods.
In the earlier paper (Ericson, 1994) we analyzed the discrete, single-period, case
[T = 0], with immediate new entry (using resources of the firms shutdown in the
same period) possible, and firms all of the same resource size (a 'standard firm'
assumption). The primary analytic result was a complete characterization of the
optimal shutdown policy, which we repeat here in the case where immediate reuse
of resources released by shutdown is not possible. The result is illustrated in
Figure 1.
Proposition 3.1. There exists a unique solution, (m*, TT*,a*), to the optimiza-
tion problem (2.8) with T — 0 such that
-I/W. = AC(m*), (3.1)







AC(m) = C(m) - C(m - 1) and AWm = Wm- Wm-lt implies a* = 0.
If
7r* = 7rm.+1 and - y^ > AC(m*),
then
-y^ = (i _ a*) • AC(m*) + ^*' AC(m* + 1), (3.2)
(1 - a*) • AWm- + a* • AWm.+1 = 0,
and a* > 0.
Furthermore, ir* < 7f as AC(-) > 0.
would change little to assume them to be growing or shrinking for exogeneous (to the policy of
the sector) reasons. Indeed, that will be the case for most industries in a transition economy
undergoing structural change.
Proof. See Propositions 1 and 2 in Ericson (1994). •
Remark 1. This is a simpler formulation than in Ericson (1994) as only resources
lying fallow at the beginning can be drawn into new enterprises. Thus the impact
of shutdown on new entry can only be felt in the future, reducing somewhat the
incentive to close failing firms. •
Remark 2. The first order conditions (3.1 and 3.2) follow immediately from plac-
ing the firms in increasing order of their likelihood of being good (IT'S); then the
worst firms, those with the lowest indices, are the first candidates to be shut down.
Thus Wm gives the expected net value of operation of the industry conditional on
m firms being shut down. •
Remark 3. The expected value of this problem is: V°(7r, No, LQ) = Wm*. Notice
that only m* firms are ever shut down, even when the conditions (3.2) are relevant;
it is never desirable to even randomize over shutting down an additional firm,
as that only adds to the expected cost, or* is just a measure of slack in the
program due to its integer nature — the amount by which —y^* falls short of
allowing another firm to be optimally shut. It is useful, as we shall see below,
for characterizing the impact of changes in the state variables (TT, N, L) on the
optimal decision and hence on the value of the problem. •
Remark 4. With linear shutdown costs (AC(ra) = C, Vm > 1) only the first, )
order conditions (3.1) are relevant: —y^* = C and IT* = — ( yo^° j
Here we extend the analysis with 'standard firms' to two periods (T = 1), with
delayed entry and with an initial set of latent firms that might enter independently
of the shutdown decision. That decision, however, affects entry in the next period.
The results here provide a foundation for a general T-period analysis.
3.1. Terminal Period problem.
In the dynamic problem, the optimal initial decision of the policy maker must take
into account what he will decide to do in the future in the situation created by that
initial decision. Thus we must begin with an analysis of the static second period
problem where there are N\ — N\Mo operating firms with 'qualities' (likelihood
of viability) ?f = (TTI, . . . , 7rni) arranged in increasing order, L\ = LoUMo potential
entrants each with expected quality q, and c(L) = c • L.
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Let us begin with the simplest case: no new entry is possible in the first period
= 0).12 Ni is then just the set of initial firms that were not shut down, i.e. such
that 7Tj > 7T* — the optimal first period cutoff expectation. The set of potential
entrants, from which some random £ standard firms will enter this (second) period,
is built from the resources of the ra* firms optimally shut down in the first period.
Thus the expected value of the problem for each possible realization of ?f is given
by
f JV m*
V°(TV, N—m*,m*) = max I S^ m -f S^ j • \ya + H • v, — C(m) —{
i=m*+m+l j
(3.3)
where ?f contains updated likelihoods of being good for firms that are active,
yi = y^i, Ni = N — ra*, and L\ = ra*.13 The solution to this problem, which we
label (m,7r,a), is given directly by Proposition 3.1:
N
V°(7t,N-m*,m*)= Y, $i + E{£\m*}'\yq + r]-C(m)-c.mm, (3.4)
t=m+l
where AC(m -f 1) > —1/~ > AC(ra) and a = 0, TT~ < 7f < TT~+1 or a > 0,
?f = 7T~+1. Note that there only a finite number of such problems possible, one for
each (N — m*)-tuple of ^-realizations of net value. This characterization allows us
to incorporate the discounted V°(7r, N — ra*, ra*) in the first period problem, as it
fully captures the impact of the first period shutdown decision on the industry's
future value.
The characterization becomes more complex when we begin with a non-trivial
set of latent forms, LQ ^  0, from which new entrants, not subject to the first
period's shutdown threshold, might appear. There is then a similar, but different,
problem for each realization of outcomes of surviving firms, for each possible
number of new entrants, 0 < I < Lo, and for each realization of outcomes of the
new firms. For any such problem, L\ = Lo + TU* — £, Ni = NQ — ra* + £, and
IT contains an (No — ra*)-subvector of updated (from priors TTJ — see equation
(2.3)) expectations for the survivors and an ^-subvector of updated (from prior q)
expected payoffs for the new entrants. Then the problem faced by the industry
12Thus reflects an assumption of initial socialist "overfull employment;" There are initially
no resources that are not fully committed to, and/or controlled by, existing enterprises.
13
 With only slight abuse of notation, let Nt, Lt stand for the number of elements in those sets




-C(ra + n) - c • (Lo + ra* - £) (3.5)
= £ fc + tw + r]-
k=m-\-l h=l
It is straightforward, if somewhat tedious, to derive the following
Proposition 3.2. Let (TT,£) be the realization of expected productivities and
new entrants at the beginning of the terminal period. Then there exists a unique
solution, (k, 7f, a), k = ra + n, to the problem (3.5) such that
7T~ = maa;{7r~,7r~}<7f<mm{7r~+1,7r~+1},
-%: = AC(m + n), (3.6)
a — 0,
or
l ) , (3.7)
Or > 0.
Furthermore, TT > ?r* unless £ > ra* and 7?j < 7f for at least ra* + 1 of the £
new entrants, which will occur with probability no greater than
TT*| TT = ^}]m*+1. (3.8)
Proof. [Outline] The proof is virtually identical to that of Proposition 3.1 (see
Ericson (1994) for more details), once both sets of firm expected values (ft's) are
placed in increasing order. The marginal cutoff is clearly determined by AC(k),
so that firms are shut down from both sets starting with the lowest TT'S, until the
next shutdown (from either set) will cause the added cost to exceed the savings
from that shutdown. Whether that occurs between firm expected values or at the
10
expected value of the next best firm determines the difference between (3.6) and
(3.7).
Clearly, if fewer than m* (necessarily new) firms have expected qualities below
TV* then AC for shutting down all those firms must be less than —2/TT*, SO new
firms with higher TT'S will be optimally shut down. Direct calculation then gives
(3.8) as an upper bound on the probability that the quality cutoff will fall in the
second period. •
Remark 5. Note that the probability in (3.8) is extremely small; indeed it is
often zero. It naturally depends on the structural probabilities in the problem
and the relationship between q and 7r*. If the realizations ofrj are insufficient to
drive the TT derived from q to below IT* then that probability is zero. As that
distance is quite large,
. _. ft +
yi-yo
for it < 7T* at least m* 4- 1 firms must draw an rj such that
(Vl + AC(m*)) (yq - y0)
(yi-yq)(-y0-AC(m*))
which can be, depending on the parameters of the problem, quite large. For
example, ifyi = — yo = 5, AC(ra*) = 2 and yq = 1, then l^)> 3.5 for the rj's
drawn by m* + 1 firms for the probability that TT < ix* holds to be positive. •
Remark 6. The notation has suppressed dependence of the state, (TT,NI,LI),
on the prior shutdown decision, m*, although that dependence is obvious in the
structure of (3.5). Thus it is clear that the current decision will depend non-
trivially on m*: fc(ra*),7f(m*),(7(ra*). •
These results give, for each (if, £) realization, a well defined value function
for this terminal period problem from which we can derive the future impact of
shutdown decisions in the preceding period:
7f, Nu Za) = § fi + [fc + r] (f^j . vA - C(k) - c^, (3.9)
where JVi = JVo — m* +1 , L\ = LQ + m* — £ and (k, n, a) is the optimal decision
in the terminal period. Notice that this reduces to (3.4) when Lo = 0, implying
that £ = 0.
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3.2. Initial Period Problem.
We can now write the Bellman Equation for the first period problem (T = 1)
when LQ = 0,
V\*,N,0) =QrnaxN I £ ft - C(m*) + fiE [v°(n,N - m\m*)\JF0] \ ,
(3.10)
and when LQ > 0,
t=m*+l{ o£ !fc - C(m*) - cZo+ (3.11)
Clearly the optimal policies for each of these problems are qualitatively similar,
as (3.10) is just a special case of (3.11). This allows generalization to any finite
horizon, as well as to the infinite horizon stationary problem.14
The solution to this problem, an optimal first-period shutdown decision, must
be based only on the information available in the first period. Thus iterated
expectations must be calculated as V°(-) is a function of T\ D T$. Hence a useful
property, a consequence of the Martingale property of Bayesian updating, is given
by the following
Lemma 3.3. Fort&ced, E [V°(7?, N0-m*+ £, LQ + m*- £)\f0] = V°((7r°, q), No
rn* -\-£,Lo + m*—£), where TT° is the (No — m*)- vector of initial firm likelihoods for
surviving firms, and q is the £-vector of prior quality evaluations of new entrants.
Proof. For any firm (dropping the subscript i ) 7r(r)) is given by equation (2.3).
Let £^ o be the operator E [«| fQ] Then, if a firm is 'good' [0 ],
J
14The latter would only be interesting as an approximation if the decision and firm response
periods were very short relative to the expected length of the "transition."
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V (l-7T). | Jf +7T-P+
Thus £?o (y») = Vi for any firm initially in operation, J?o (Si) = Q for any entrant,
and the expected future value, conditional on initial information and the number
of new entrants, is unaffected by the output realizations at the end of the first
period. •
The solution to (3.10) and (3.11) clearly depends on how V°(-) varies in m,
the number of firms initially shut down, and in the latter case, on how that
varies in the number of new entrants [See Remark 6]. Let V^°(m; •) represent the
optimized value in the terminal period [see (3.9)] as a function of the number of
firms shut down in the prior period, m, and the number of new firms, £. That
value is generated by the solution mt(m) to the terminal problem (3.5) given in
Proposition 3.2.
Lemma 3.4. TO^(ra) + 1 > rnt(m — 1) > rht{m) for all feasible (m,£), and
rni(m) — rfik(m) for all feasible (m,£,k). Hence rnt{m) is non-increasing in m,
and independent of L
Proof. The conditions determining the choice of rnt(m) are in equations (3.6)
and (3.7). As there is no dependence on the number of new firms operating in
that period, the second assertion is obvious, and we can wlog drop £ from our
expressions here. Let m = ra(ra — 1) be the number closed, and h(rn) be the
index of that marginal firm. As the lowest expected value firms are shutdown
first in any period, closing one more means that there is one less low 71*, so that
the same cutoff likelihood, TT, can be reached with one fewer shutdown, i.e. at
a saving of AC(ra). Whether that is the optimal response to the extra initial
shutdown depends on whether —yje(m)+i — AC(ra). If so, m(m) = m; the same
13
number of firms are shut down, despite one more having been closed earlier. If
not, then ra(m) = m — 1, as it is too costly to close down another firm. Notice
that a single extra prior shutdown will never lead to more than m closures in the
second period, as optimization insures that AC(ra + 1) > —y^m)- "
The different cases in this Lemma are illustrated in Figure 2. This allows us to
readily characterize the impact of the prior choice of shutdowns on the subsequent
value of the problem. Let AV?(m) = V?(m\ •) — Vf(m — 1; •) be the total impact
of increasing prior shutdowns by one on the expected value in the terminal period,
and let AV^e(ra) be the impact of increasing the number of latent firms by one
through shutting down an ra-th firm.
Lemma 3.5. The variation in the value function due to a unit increase in prior
shutdown is given by:
^ m ) b, + r] - c.
2. ?(
Proof. (1) follows from direct calculation:
Lo—t+m
AV/(m) = [yq + r] £ j . u^m - (Lo - I + m) c
Lo-t+m-l
(2) is immediate from the first order conditions in Proposition 3.2, (3.6 or 3.7),
where clearly - j£ ( m ) = max{-y~(m)+1, AC(ra(ra))}. •
Remark 7. While the above results are formulated for the problem (3.11), they
all hold as well for (3.10) with LY = m (Lo = I = 0). •
Remark 8. These are the key comparative statics results that we need. We could
also readily calculate the impact of independent changes in ff or Ni or L\ as done
in Proposition 4 of Ericson (1994). The qualitative results would be the same. •
Remark 9. Notice that AVJP(m) is a decreasing function ofm, as both its com-
ponents are such. This insures that second order conditions are automatically
satisfied. •
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The main result of the two-period analysis is the derivation of an optimal
policy that can be compared with other, perhaps institutionally constrained, ap-
proaches to restructuring of the industry. While by definition better than any
other shutdown policy, it has a dynamic structure that is interesting to compare
with that of other policies, for example, one in which all shutdown decisions must
be made in the initial period (perhaps because politics will not allow a continu-
ation). The key trade-offs revolve around three factors: 'bad' firms will continue
destroying social wealth if not closed, new entry will not be forthcoming without
early shutdowns, but the convexity of full shutdown costs implies that it is socially
wasteful to shutdown too many firms too rapidly — those costs are minimized by
spreading evenly.
To see this, define AWm to be the variation in Wl(ir, NO, LO) as the ra-th firm
(starting from the lowest TT) is shut down:







Pulling together and integrating the above results then gives us:
Proposition 3.6. The unique optimal policy for the two-period problem (3.11),
|(m*,7r*,a*), (k(m*),7f(m*),a(m*))\ , gives total expected value
and satisfies the second period marginal conditions




and the first period marginal conditions
Km* < 7T* < 7Tm*+i, (T* = 0 ,
- + P [y?(m.) - &»•(% + *•)])= A C K ) + /fc, (3.13)
or
7T* = 7T m . + i , CT* > 0 ,
- (jfr- + /? [^(m.} - £m.(% + r)]) = (1 - <7*)AC
(3.14)
where £m = Ejlo R ° (Lo + m* - j) < ° ^ I j } 15 ,and (m.(yq + r) is the prior
expected value of the marginal entrant when m* firms are shut. Furthermore, if
there are any firms with 7TJ € [TT* , 7f),
7T>E0 [n(m*)] > 7T*, Eo \rn{m*)} > 0, (3.15)
so that shutdown continues to increasingly high quality, albeit still expected value
destroying, firms despite the prior elimination of the lowest quality (TTJ < TT*).
Proof. The results follow from the arguments of Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 and
the results of Lemmata 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5. The second period characterization is







so that by Lemma 3.5 the first variation of the total payoff in the initial decision
is:
15
 Clearly £m is quite small as the probability of the coincidence of a number of unlikely
(marginal) events [See equation (2.6)]. These events become oven less likely as Lo and/or
m increase. For example, if U( is truncated poisson, LQ = 3, and m = 2, then £m = .004;
Lo = 0, m = 2 =• Zm - 068; Lo = 0, m = 4 => fm £* .0008.
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= -2/m - / % ( m ) - (AC(m) 4- pc) + /? [yg + r] £m. (3.17)
As Ajym is monotonically decreasing in m, AWi > 0, and AWm < 0 for any m
such that ?rm > 7f, the optimum occurs at m* such that
AWm. > 0 > AWm .+ 1 ,
that is,
( [ ]) > AC(m*)+/?c, (3.18)
If there exists a ?r* G [7Tm., ?rm.+1] such that - (y*. + p [t^r(m*) - £m* (yg + r)]) =
AC(m*) +Pc, then we are in case (3.13). If not, then the relevant FOC's are given
by (3.14).
To see (3.15), first note that AC(1) > 0 implies that, without a future, no firm
with positive expected payoff will ever be shut; indeed, no firm with —2/» < AC(1)
will be shut, unless there are sufficient future savings and expected value from
entry induced by that closing. That Eo [ft(m*)] > ir* follows immediately from
Lemma 3.3 and the fact that the expected payoff to all new entrants is yq > 0.
Thus the only firms that might be expected to be shut down are those with
7Ti € [7r*,7f), so the expected cutoff must be in that region. Since AC(ra) is
increasing in m, and —yn* = AC(ra*) ^» AC(1), if there are any firms with
7ii € [7T*,7f) at least one of them must be optimally shut down. Hence 7f >
#o mm*)] > 7T*, Eo [rn(m*)] > 0. •
The structure of the solution to this industrial policy problem is illustrated in
Figure 3, which shows how the second period solution builds in the first. This
proposition provides the basis for a number of comparative statics/dynamics ex-
ercises, exploring the dynamic structure of an optimal industrial policy during the
transition. For example, it shows that the marginal shutdown likelihood, 7r*, is
clearly greater when a future period is considered, than in its absence (compare
with Proposition 3.1 and Figure 1). We now turn to further exploration of such
comparisons in the next section.
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4. Some Comparative Statics/Dynamics.
Here we explore the impact of varying information and the planning horizon on
the nature of the optimal solution. The results are largely corollaries of the
Propositions above, so we avoid full proofs.
4.1. The Value of Information.
How does better information affect the optimal shutdown policy and the 'option
value' of delaying the shutdown decision? Intuitively, it is clear that the optimal
policy must become more aggressive with better information, as mistakes are less
likely to be made and there is less to learn from waiting. The extreme case
of this situation is that of perfect information about the quality of all existing
firms, although actual outcomes in any period remain uncertain and firms yet
to enter are still of uncertain quality q > W. Then the initial No firms can be
divided into two sets: NQ "good" firms with expected net return y\ > 0, and NQ
"bad" firms with expected net return yo < 0. In the terminal period there will be
•Wi = NQ — TTI* -\-£ operating firms, where m* is the number shutdown and £ is the
number of new entrants from the initial resource pool Lo, and L\ = LQ + ra* — £
potential firms whose resources remain fallow. Clearly the problem faced by the
planner is identical to that in equation (3.5) with y,, i = 0,1, in place of yk, for
'bad' and 'good' firms respectively.
NuLuT) = (N+ + £+)Vl + (No~ - m* + £~ - k)y0 + (4.1)
h=\
The solution is a straightforward corollary of Proposition (3.2):
Proposition 4.1. Let £ = (£+,£~) be the realization of new entrants at the
beginning of the terminal period. Then there exists a unique optimal solution,
(k, 7T, a), to the problem (4.1) such that
7f = 0 (4.2)
-yo = (l - a)AC(k) + aAC(k + 1)




and J = 0, (4.3)
i.e. it is never optimal to close a "good" [yi] firm.
This solution is illustrated in Figure 4- It again gives a well-defined value
function for the terminal period problem:
V°'(7f', Nlt Li) = N+ • Vl + (N{ - k)y0 + [yq + r] (4.4)
where superscript ' / ' indicates "full information" JTT{ 6 {0,1}, Vi], iV^ 1" = ATQ" +
^
+
, iVJ" = A^ T — m*-\-£~, and Li = Lo+m* — £+ —£~. This value, and its variation
in m*, is a key input into solving the full two-period problem.
In the terminal period all remaining "bad" firms are closed unless the imme-
diate incremental cost of doing so exceeds the maximum expected loss from the
continued operation of such a firm. Thus only in the case of extraordinarily large
incremental (social) costs of shutdown [—t/o < AC(iVf)] will known "bad" firms
be left in operation. It is also immediate that enterprise shutdowns will go deeper
into the industry, closing some firms left in operation in the first period, unless
there were none left and/or t~ > m*. Thus the optimal policy with full knowledge
of the quality of operating firms is substantially more aggressive than without
such knowledge; there is no possibility of making a mistake. That is even clearer
in the initial period, where any incentive to spread costs is dominated by the sure
gains from eliminating value-destroying operations and the absence of any benefit
to waiting.
As in the preceding section, the initial period's Bellman Equation is
Vlf(<Kf,NQ,L0) = max
0<m*<JNT
- m*)y0-C(m*) - cL0+
<
- m * j,Lo
since it never pays to shut down a "good" firm. As above, the solution can be
easily characterized:
Proposition 4.2. Necessary and sufficient conditions for an optimal solution
| (772/, 71/, a*), (fc-^(m^), fif(mf))\ to the two-period full-information problem (4.5)
(4.5)
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are given in Proposition 4.1 for the terminal period, and for the initial period by:
AC(mf) + j3c < -(yo + p[Vo-£mf(yq + r)})<AC(mf + l) + pc, (4.6)
where U = £ {vj* (Lo + m - j) !
j=o
andvo = max{y0,— AC(fc)}, (4.7)
implying that
7Tf = 0,
and a ' € [0,1), if mf < AT". (4.8)
If, however,
-2/o + P[VQ - (N-(yq + r)] >
m-^  = 7V^ " and crf = 0.
Again we can see that full information leads to optimal maximal shutdown of
"bad" firms as illustrated (heuristically, ignoring integer constraints) in Figure 5.
Indeed, it is clearly far more aggressive than in the single period case as — vQ ^> c,
even without the possibility of new high quality entry whose marginal value is
reflected in £.(yq + r).
These results give us a possible measure of the value of information to the
industry policymaker. Clearly the fact that m* > TO* and & >k whenever there
is the same number of "bad" firms left in the industry, shows that the information
reduces the loses from the operation of 'bad" firms and avoids the loss of net value
from "good" firms, thereby raising the value of the industry to the planner. By
virtue of optimization, the marginal costs of the additional shutdowns, AC(-)+/?c,
are no greater than the marginal benefits, —yo — (3VQ + £.(i/g + r), and this is
reflected in the increase in the optimal value of the program. This is clear given
full information about the quality of firms. Prom the perspective of a decision
maker with only limited information, TT, about quality, however, that may not
appear to be the case, as some "bad" firms may have high n, thus decreasing
V^(«) [the uninformed apparent value] when shut down, while some "good" firms
may have low n and so reduce Vrl(*) when left in operation.. Thus the difference
in values, V1* — V1, cannot provide a reliable measure of the value of (in this case,
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full) information to the industry planner. There is, however, a natural measure of
this value of information in this difference conditioned on the better information:16





where superscript '+' indicates the number of "good" firms shut under the un-
informed policy, whenever No and new entry are the same in both situations.
Notice that the increase in costs due to extral shutdown is always dominated by
the savings from eliminating a surely "bad" firm, while keeping a good firm is a
solid gain from both the cost and benefit side.
We expect this increase value to hold for less extreme improvements in in-
formation; the better the information about the underlying quality of the firm,
the greater the value of the problem to the planner. To pursue this, one needs a
precise definition of "better" information. Here I propose, without exploring its
fall implications, one such definition.
Definition 4.3. For a given set ofGrms N — N+UN~, where N+ contains firms
with expected value y\ and N~ contains those of expected value yo, we say that
a likelihood vector ?r' is more informative than IT if the vector inequalities,
TT/+ > TT+ and Ti7" < TT~, hold with at least one strict inequality, where the
superscripts refer to the corresponding subsets of firms in N.
The definition is illustrated in Figure 6. Note that this definition is consistent
with an improvement in information under Bayesian updating of the likelihoods,
?r; as the argument in Lemma 3.3 indicates, TT is increasing to 1 conditional on
the firm being "good," while it is decreasing to 0 when the firm is "bad." It is
16Notice that, given identical initial conditions and realizations of ?fc, the carrying costs of
latent firms and the impact of new entry is identical in both situations. Hence, conditioning
on the true quality of operating firms, we need only consider the direct impact of differing shut
down decisions.
21
immediately evident that there will be greater likelihood of shutdown of firms
likely to be "bad" and a lesser likelihood of closing firms expected to be "good."
This is reflected in an increase in the expected savings from the m* firms to be
shut down and an increase in the expected value created by those firms remaining
in operation. It is always the case, conditional on the better information, that the
increase in expected savings will compensate for the marginal cost of additional
shutdown, thereby further increasing the value of the program V1(7r, N, L). This
reflects the fact that the expected cost of each of the two types of errors balanced
in the optimal policy is reduced by more information. It is just a matter of
straightforward calculations, similar to those above, to show:
Proposition 4.4. For given sets, N, L, of active and latent firms, if the likeli-
hood distribution IT' is more informative than n, then V1(?r/, N, L) > V1(?r, N, L),
conditional on the information in T\? .
Thus we can clearly see the value of information in this model. Further, we
see that improved information can make the optimal policy no less aggressive (in
terms of likelihood cutoff for shutdown), so that the Bayesian learning that takes
place with the passage of time will tend to stimulate further shutdowns, even if
no further "bad" firms arise. Only the elimination of shutdown targets, i.e. those
firms with — yVi > C(l), will lead an optimal restructuring policy to avoid all
further shutdowns.
4.2. Planning Horizon and Optimal Timing.
In Proposition 3.6 we saw that the optimal cut-off likelihood for shutting down
weak firms was increasing in the length of the horizon (T = 1 > 0). It is also the
case that the marginal shutdown likelihood increases when there are two periods,
but no shutdown is allowed in the second period. In that case, the marginal
benefit to shutdown increases by a factor of (1 + /?) as expected savings from
closing value-destroying firms now accrue over two periods, while the incremental
carrying costs of unemployed resources are only /3c < /3C(1) < —Py**. Hence
a greater marginal cost, AC('), is justified, allowing more firms to be optimally
shut down as can be seen by comparing Figure 1 and Figure 3.
But a more interesting comparison is, naturally, between the two-period sit-
uations with and without the possibility of second period shutdown. The latter
might arise if, for example, a change in the political situation were to prevent
any further shutdown in the second period. Both cases take into account the
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fact that current shutdown of failing firms implies savings both now and in the
future, but only the former case allows the optimal spreading of (convex) costs
over both periods. Note that this implies that a single round of closures (if that
were all that was politically, say, feasible) should never be put off until the later
period; bearing the costs "up front" allows for two periods of savings, always ex-
ceeding the extra maintenance costs of unemployed resources [C(l) > c], as well
as for potential entry of new productive firms. Thus we might expect that the
policy should be more conservative when there is an option for future shutdown.
That this is indeed the case is easy to see, although optimal cumulative shutdown
across two periods is naturally greater than the total that is optimal when only
one round of shutdown of failing firms is possible.








where L{ = Lo 4- m* — j . Again let AWm be the marginal gain from closing the
ra-th firm,
AWm = - (1 + P)ym + U[yg + r] - AC(m) - /fc,
where £m* is defined in Proposition 3.6.17 Then, at the optimum, as in all the
prior results (eg. equation (3.18)),
r] > AC(m**)+/?c (4.11)
(3c
Lo
Comparing with equations (3.13) shows that the optimal first period cutoff, 7T**,
must be greater than IT* when there is no second period opportunity to close firms:
—2/7r(m*) < ~"2/m* QS E[7r(m*)] > 7T* (3.15), so it is optimal be bear only a lesser
cost of shutdown in the initial period. Further, TT** can be no greater than 7f(m*)
without violating the first order conditions. Thus, as again illustrated in Figure
5, the possibility of cost spreading gives
17Cm* is the same here, modulus the differing TO* , as it is a function only of the initial conditions
and first period decision.
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Proposition 4.5. The optimal first-period shutdown margin, ?r*, is lower than
7T**, and hence fewer firms are shutdown in the first period, when further shutdown
is possible in the second period, than is the case when shutdown decisions can
only be made in the first period.
Corollary 4.6. ra* -f k(m*) > ra**, i.e. more total shutdown optimally occurs
when it can take place in both periods.
With two periods in which to make shutdown decisions the optimal policy is
hence less aggressive in the first period, while eventually cutting deeper into the
pool of firms likely to be "bad." This result provides one sense in which "shock
therapy" could be considered optimal when there is a narrow political 'window of
opportunity' as has been argued in, among others, Aslund (1995).
Another comparison of interest deals with the optimal policy trajectory when
there will be perfect information in the final, but significant uncertainty in the
initial, decision period. The two-period problem is formally still given by (3.11),
with V° replaced by V0* and JVj" and N{ depend on the prior shutdown decision,
ra* = m+ 4- m~, including mistaken shutdowns of 'good' firms: ra+.18 The key
to understanding how that dramatic improvement in information affects the first
period optimal decision lies in the variational analysis, similar to that in Lemmata
(3.4) and (3.5), of V°f(-), as the initial period shutdown level, ra, changes. It is
straightforward to see:
Lemma 4.7. Let hi- (ra) be the optimal shutdown in the second (full informa-
tion) period when l~ "bad" firms enter, and AV^  (m) be the expected change in
value for the entry of I — £+ +t~ new firms, when m firms are shutdown in the
first period. Then
1. kt-(m) = kt-(m - 1) if AC(NQ + ir - m + 1) > -y0;
IfAC(No + t~ - m + 1) < - y e then kt-(m) = kt-(m - 1) + 1;
2. AV?f(m) = AV?(ra) ifAC{No + fr - m + 1) > -y0;
If AC (NQ +£--m+l)< -2/o, then
AV?f(m) = -7f(m)yi + (l-7f(
[see Lemma 3.5].
18This is a critical difference from the two-period full information case where there is never a
mistake of shutting down "good" firms, so ra* = ra~ only.
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Proof. This follows almost immediately from Proposition 4.1, letting 7f(m) be the
cutoff likelihood when m firms are closed in the first period. If the marginal cost of
shutting all remaining bad firms is less than — yo, it will be done. If an additional
firm is then shut earlier, the cost of doing so later if it is "bad", AC(fc/-(m — 1)),
is saved, as ki-{m) = ki-(m — 1) — 1. If, however, it was "good," then there is
an expected loss in value of output, — yit so the impact on program value (ex-
ante) is determined by the prior probability that the firm is "good" (therefore not
requiring shutdown). If, on the other hand, it is too costly to close all "bad" firms
in the second period, then that will remain the case with the additional shutdown,
ki-(m) = ki-(m — 1), and the impact on (ex-ante) expected value of the program
is the same as with continuing imperfect information: with probability 7f(ra), y\
is lost, and with probability (1 — ?f(ra)), — yo is gained. Finally, the impact on
the expected value of new entry is unaffected by the improved information in the
second period. •
This result allows us to give some conditions such that full information in
the final period leads to greater caution earlier. They depend critically on how
many "bad" firms there turn out to be, after shutdowns and new entry have taken
place. Of course, in the first period the industry decision maker can never be sure
how many "bad" firms there are, and so must probability-weight the two payoff
relevant events analyzed in Lemma 4.7; his expectation of future value will depend
not only on his beliefs about the quality of existing firms but on the distribution
over the entry of "bad" firms. To state our result, let A(m) be the event that
{N{(m,£-) > C^i-yo)}, N{(m,£-) = N£ +t~ -m+1, and B(m) be its
complement. The Bellman equation, as before, is
{ LQ
3=1
where terminal value is given by equation (4.4), and its expectation is taken with
respect to the distribution of "good" [N*] and "bad" [JVf ] firms.
Theorem 4.8. An optimal solution {(m°,7ro,a°), (fco(mo),8r°(ra0))} to the two
period problem with second-period full information satisfies conditions (4.2) on
event A(m°) and (4.3) on B(m°) for the terminal period. For the initial period,
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the necessary and sufficient conditions are given by:
TTmO < 7T° < 7Tmo+1 , <7° = 0 ,
- U°(yq + r)]) = AC(m°) + /3c,
or
7T° = 7 T m o + 1
- (2/.o + p [y^ - Uo (yq + r)]) = (1 - a°)AC(m°) + <r°AC(m0 + 1) + (3c,
on event A(m°), i.e. when known "bad" firms are optimally left in operation in
the second period. On event B(m°),
<J° = 0,
or
[ A i " (1 " **)AC(iVr) - ^mo(2/9 4- r)])
give the appropriate marginal conditions. Further, (iry\ — (1 — 7r)AC(A^1~)J >
2/TTO > v 0 > 2/o-
Remark 10. When some "bad" firms must optimally remain in operation in the
second period [event A(m0)], the marginal conditions are the same as those when
the shutdown decision can only be made in the first period [see (4.11)]. However, if
there is some slack [event B(m0)], or even a positive probability of such slack, then
the policy with full information in the future period becomes more conservative,
ra° < m** and 7r° < ?r**.
Note that the uncertainty in the first period reduces the expected marginal
return in the second period, despite full information at that time, because of the
marginal likelihood, TT0, of shutting down a good firm by mistake. Thus this policy
is more cautious than the full information first period optimal policy: m° < m*.
It will usually, however, not be more cautious in the first period than the optimal
policy in the uninformed case (Theorem 3.6), which, as we have seen, is more
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conservative than shutdown policy when there is not a second round. Whether it
is so, depends on the relationship between y%(m*) and (ir°yi — (1 — TT°)AC(N{')J
and on the probability of B(m°). If slack in the second period, implying low
marginal costs of second period shutdown, is sufficiently likely, i.e. there are few
"bad" firms and a low probability of entry of such, then it will be optimal to hold
back in the first period, setting 7T° < TT* , thereby spreading some of those costs
across the two periods. In event A(m°), however, m° = m** > m*, so better
information in the future encourages more aggressive initial restructuring.
5. Conclusions.
The analysis of this paper deals with the simplest formulation of a dynamic in-
dustry restructuring problem. It makes a number of quite strong assumptions in
order to get an analytic handle on the complexities of enterprise shutdowns dur-
ing the transition process. Among the assumptions that one would like to relax
are those of the homogeneity of firms (the 'standard firm' assumption), the direct
connection between the market generated signal of 'viability' and the social value
of the firm, the lack of interdependence among firms, the static environment, and
the inability of firms to alter their own viability through investment. These, as
well as extending the analysis to a multiperiod frame work, provide directions for
continuing research.
Despite these limitations, the model provides a basis for useful insights into
some of the difficulties of the transition. It captures, in tractable ways, critical
elements of the process — the randomness in current performance, the uncertainty
about underlying viability, the learning from performance outcomes, the convex
costs of closing industrial operations, the costs of keeping released resources usable
in the future, and finally, the critical connection between shutdowns and new entry.
The results of the model highlight the necessary conservatism of the optimal
policy: it balances the marginal costs of errors arising from the lack of information,
leaving many firms that are likely to be net value-destroying in operation. This, in
part, is a reflection of the option value of 'waiting;' the industry policy maker will
know better in the future whether the firm is 'bad' or not. Despite this, however,
the optimal policy is more aggressive in the early period, reflecting two factors.
First, the expected savings to any closure in the first period accrue over the full
horizon, and hence are worth almost twice savings in the second period. Second,
shutdown in the first period allows for greater entry of valuable new firms in the
second period. Both factors work to limit the desire of an optimizing industry
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authority to spread the convex costs of necessary shutdowns over both periods,
and indeed counteract, to some extent, the option value of waiting.
The second factor, highlighted in this model, has been, I believe, underappreci-
ated in the transition literature. The release of resources from wasteful industrial
operations acts as a countervailing option to that of waiting. By facilitating new
start-ups with an expected viability much greater than that of the closed enter-
prises, the release of resources from shutdowns mitigates the hysteresis induced
by the value of waiting. It must be emphasized that this is an effect that would
be absent if the shutdown decision were being taken in a well functioning mar-
ket economy where resources for new start-ups are available at their opportunity
cost. In transition economies, and in particular the former Soviet Union, that is
far from the case; resources, even if unemployed or seriously underemployed, are
largely frozen in place by prior socialist overemployment policies, the lack of work-
ing factor markets (missing infrastructure and intermediaries), the lack of usable
property rights, and transition policies that support existing industrial operations,
strengthening their grip on existing resources and factors of production. One of
the key messages of this paper is that shutting down existing industrial operations,
by refusing to support them when the expectation that they are market-viable is
sufficiently low, has an additional positive impact through new entry that must
be considered in transition industrial policy.
Thus the optimal shutdown threshold, and number of optimally closed firms,
is a complex function of many such factors that balances the countervailing forces
introduced in the model. Overall, it supports something of a 'big bang' approach
in the sense that earlier shutdown generally dominates, even when information is
expected to improve dramatically in the future, and the number of firms optimally
shut down declines rapidly over time. Convexity of costs and the possibility of
mistakenly closing viable firms, however, limit the size of that initial 'bang,' as
well as the number of future shutdowns, unless there is a dramatic improvement
in information. Better information about the underlying quality of firms generally
leads to a more aggressive first-period shutdown policy, as does a longer horizon,
and full information maximizes the amount of shutdown that it is optimal to
undertake. These results provide the first steps toward developing a general model
of industrial transition, one which must include interdependencies among the firms
and the ability of firms to make autonomous decisions about their own future, as
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